On January 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the addition of four individuals, five entities, and one vessel to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). This action, published in the Federal Register on January 22, 2026, targets networks supporting Ansarallah, commonly referred to as the Houthis, under the authority of Executive Order 13224. Originally issued in 2001 to combat terrorism, this order was amended by President Trump through Executive Order 13886 in 2019 to enhance its scope. The designations block all property and interests in property of the listed parties within U.S. jurisdiction and generally prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with them. This move underscores ongoing U.S. efforts to counter financial facilitation of groups deemed to support terrorism, particularly in the context of regional instability in Yemen and the broader Middle East.
Background on the Sanctions Program
Executive Order 13224, issued on September 23, 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks, authorizes the blocking of assets and prohibition of transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. The 2019 amendment by President Trump via Executive Order 13886 expanded the criteria to include broader support activities, such as training and recruitment. Ansarallah was designated under this framework in January 2021 for its actions threatening Yemen's peace and stability, including attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. The current designations build on this by targeting facilitators in the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and the Marshall Islands, who allegedly provide material support, financial assistance, or services to Ansarallah or linked entities like Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, itself previously sanctioned.
The Federal Register notice details how these parties have enabled Ansarallah's operations, often through petroleum trade and shipping networks. For instance, the designations cite material assistance under section 1(a)(iii)(C) of the amended order, which covers providing financial, material, or technological support to blocked persons.
Key Individuals and Their Roles
The notice identifies four individuals central to these networks.
Imran Asghar, a Pakistani national residing in Dubai, is designated for supporting Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC. Born December 19, 1962, Asghar holds passports from Pakistan and reportedly Iran. OFAC states he has 'materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of' Arkan Mars.
Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, a Yemeni national in Dubai, born August 27, 1980, is linked directly to Ansarallah for similar support activities.
Zayd Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi, born March 15, 1989, in Yemen, holds Yemeni and Saint Kitts and Nevis passports. Based in Sana'a, he is accused of providing material support to Ansarallah.
Adil Mutahhar Abdallah Al Muayyad, born August 20, 1975, in Yemen, is designated under section 1(a)(iii)(A) for being owned, controlled, or directed by Ansarallah.
These individuals operate primarily in the UAE and Yemen, leveraging Dubai's role as a financial hub to facilitate transactions.
Designated Entities and Vessel
Five entities are listed, mostly involved in oil trading and shipping.
Adeema Oil FZC, established in 2011 in Dubai, is designated for supporting Ansarallah through petroleum-related activities.
Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, based in Sana'a, Yemen, is similarly targeted for material assistance to Ansarallah.
New Ocean Trading FZE, founded in 2019 in Sharjah, UAE, engages in wholesale trade and is linked to Ansarallah support.
Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC, established in 2002 in Dubai, is designated for aiding Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC.
Albarraq Shipping Co, registered in the Marshall Islands in 2025, is accused of providing support services to Ansarallah.
Additionally, the crude oil tanker Albarraq Z, with IMO identification 9252943, is identified as property of Albarraq Shipping Co. Built in 2003 and formerly flagged under Comoros, it falls under the sanctions for its ownership link.
Graphics in the Federal Register, likely illustrating network connections, highlight the interconnected nature of these oil and shipping operations.
Legal Basis and Precedents
The designations rely on Executive Order 13224, as amended by President Trump's Executive Order 13886, which modernized the framework to address evolving terrorism threats. Precedents include prior OFAC actions against Houthi financiers, such as the 2021 designation of Ansarallah itself and subsequent listings of supporters in 2023 and 2024. Courts have upheld such sanctions, as seen in cases like Kadi v. Geithner (D.D.C. 2012), where due process challenges were addressed through administrative reviews. The secondary sanctions risk under section 1(b) warns non-U.S. persons of potential penalties for dealings with these parties.
Implications and Perspectives
Short-term effects include immediate asset freezes and transaction bans, potentially disrupting Ansarallah's funding for military activities, such as Red Sea disruptions. Long-term, this could deter international businesses from engaging with Houthi-linked networks, isolating them economically.
From a U.S. perspective, officials view these sanctions as vital for national security, with OFAC Director Bradley T. Smith signing the notice. Critics, including some humanitarian groups, argue sanctions may exacerbate Yemen's crisis by hindering aid, though OFAC provides licenses for humanitarian activities. Ansarallah representatives have dismissed such measures as ineffective aggression. Regional players like the UAE may see this as support for anti-Houthi efforts, while Iran, often accused of backing the group, could face indirect pressure.
Forward-Looking Conclusion
These designations reinforce U.S. commitment to countering terrorism financing, potentially leading to further investigations or international cooperation. Challenges include enforcement in jurisdictions like the UAE and evasion tactics by sanctioned parties. Ongoing debates center on balancing security with humanitarian needs in Yemen, with possible trajectories involving diplomatic negotiations or escalated enforcement actions.
