The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has released a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) on October 27, 2025, seeking to modernize submarine cable landing license rules. This initiative addresses evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy risks, particularly from foreign adversaries. The FNPRM proposes a framework for licensing entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE), new certifications to exclude foreign adversary involvement, expedited application processing for secure systems, and incentives for using trusted technologies. Published in the Federal Register under Volume 90, Number 205, the proposal invites public comments by November 26, 2025, with replies due December 26, 2025. This follows the FCC's 2024 Cable NPRM and aligns with broader U.S. efforts to secure communications infrastructure, as emphasized in President Trump's America First Investment Policy, which underscores that economic security is national security.
Background and Regulatory Context
The FNPRM builds on the FCC's authority under the Cable Landing License Act of 1921 and Executive Order 10530, issued by President Eisenhower in 1954 and attributed here to ongoing executive priorities under President Trump. Submarine cables are critical for global data transmission, but they face increasing threats from foreign adversaries, including potential espionage and disruption. The document references recent incidents like the Salt Typhoon cyber espionage linked to the People's Republic of China, highlighting vulnerabilities in U.S. communications networks.
The FCC's actions are part of a comprehensive strategy, including the establishment of a Council for National Security in March 2025 and rules prohibiting untrustworthy entities in equipment authorization programs. The proposal identifies foreign adversaries based on the Department of Commerce's list, including China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. It seeks to balance security with efficient deployment, noting that excessive regulation could deter investment and undermine resilience.
Proposed Framework for SLTE Owners and Operators
A central proposal requires entities owning or operating SLTE—key equipment for converting signals in submarine cable systems—to become licensees. SLTE allows control over cable capacity, raising concerns about foreign adversary access without oversight. The FNPRM suggests granting blanket licenses to existing SLTE owners, subject to exclusions for those owned, controlled, or directed by foreign adversaries or listed on the FCC's Covered List under the Secure Networks Act.
Routine conditions would include compliance with FCC rules, annual circuit capacity reports, and a tailored SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report for high-risk entities. This report would detail ownership, SLTE locations, and third-party operations, filed annually to ensure oversight. The proposal cites Committee concerns that foreign adversary-controlled SLTE could enable interception of U.S. data, posing counterintelligence risks. Comments are sought on alternatives like regular reporting instead of blanket licensing to minimize burdens.
New Certifications and Routine Conditions
To further mitigate risks, the FNPRM proposes certifications prohibiting the use of equipment or services from foreign adversary entities in submarine cable operations. Applicants must certify non-use of such equipment, with routine conditions extending this to third-party providers and IRU/leasing arrangements involving Covered List entities.
Additional conditions include notifications for changes in coordinates, system retirements, or foreign adversary ownership shifts. An exception is proposed for wet-segment repair services due to limited alternatives, though incentives for non-foreign adversary ships are explored. The document references the Covered List, which identifies equipment posing unacceptable national security risks, and seeks input on transition timelines for removing such items from existing systems.
Expedited Processing and Incentives for Trusted Technologies
The FNPRM outlines standards for presumptively excluding applications from referral to Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector. Qualifications include good standing, enhanced cybersecurity plans (e.g., aligned with NIST frameworks), physical security measures, and no foreign adversary ownership below 5%.
It also seeks ways to incentivize trusted technologies from the U.S. and allies, such as prioritizing licenses for cables using American AI standards or interconnecting with secure data centers. This aligns with President Trump's policy to promote U.S. leadership in critical technologies like AI and 5G.
Additional Reforms and Considerations
Proposals include streamlining domestic cable approvals and modifying existing mitigation agreements for consistency. The FNPRM addresses artificial intelligence in SLTE, seeking comments on national security impacts, and explores sharing application data with federal agencies confidentially.
Costs and benefits are analyzed, with potential burdens on small entities noted, though streamlined processes could offset them. The FCC estimates initial costs for SLTE licensing at about $18,200 per entity but seeks input on minimizing impacts.
In summary, these proposals aim to secure submarine cables while fostering investment, with public input shaping final rules to protect U.S. interests without undue regulatory burden.